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Public Use or Public Purpose?:
The Ever-Changing Role of the Courts
and the Legislature in Interpreting the
Public Use Clause in Deciding Whether a
State Can Take Private Property in Eminent
Domain Proceedings for the Purpose of
Promoting Private Economic Development
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well-settled that a state or federal government can seize
private property for public use, provided that the private party is
given a fair compensation for the taking.! However, the interpre-
tation of what exactly constitutes a public use has been widely
debated in nearly every jurisdiction, resulting in an expanding
and contracting role of the courts in determining what takings
actually are constitutional under the Fifth Amendment. The on-
going debate concerning how far a state government should be
able to stretch the meaning of public use culminated in June of
2005 with the decision handed down by the United States Su-
preme Court in Kelo v. City of New London.! There, the Court de-
termined that private property may be condemned in favor of pri-
vate economic development.3 This decision naturally sparked a
flurry of public outrage that resulted in several states proposing
legislation with the aim of preventing the most severe of conse-
quences contemplated in Kelo's dissenting opinions. To begin, this
comment will trace the evolution of the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Public Use Clause.
The interpretation of "public use" in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania has been far murkier than it has been in the deluge
of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, almost to a point where it is dif-
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
reads in part: "[Nior shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." Id. This prohibition has been selectively incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment to bar any state from doing what would otherwise be prohibited by the Fifth
Amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-42 (1897). See
also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
3. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669.
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ficult to precisely ascertain the meaning of the phrase "public use"
in Pennsylvania. This comment will address this issue by outlin-
ing the history of the Pennsylvania courts' interpretation of the
public use clause and briefly discussing the impact of the Kelo de-
cision on eminent domain law in the Commonwealth.
After outlining the interpretation of "public use" in the Supreme
Court and Pennsylvania jurisprudence, this comment will analyze
the changing role of the Court in determining its power to review
acts of the legislature in the realm of the public use doctrine. In
doing so, it will be determined whether any inconsistencies exist
between the recent decisions in this area of the law as opposed to
another key area of federal constitutional law, namely the inter-
pretation of the Commerce Clause, and elucidate any readily as-
certainable reasons for the inconsistencies.
Finally, this comment will examine several proposed statutes
from selected jurisdictions and discuss the potential advantages
and disadvantages of each to determine which, if any, is the best
approach.
II. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME CoUR's EXPANDING
INTERPRETATION OF THE PUBLIC USE CLAUSE
Prior to the twentieth century, there was a lack of high court
cases dealing with the takings clause and the public use doctrine.
The Supreme Court, therefore, had not directly dealt with the
meaning of the public use clause until around the turn of the
twentieth century. In Clark v. Nash,4 for example, the United
States Supreme Court addressed the meaning of public use in the
context of a statute that authorized the widening of irrigation
ditches across the private property of one landowner for the bene-
fit of other landowners.5 The Court, in that case, held that the use
was a public one because the circumstances in the case dictated
that it was a public use.6 In other words, the term public use did
not have a concrete meaning. It did not mean a literal use by the
public; instead, it was a more malleable meaning that depended
on the unique facts of the case in question.7
4. 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
5. Clark, 198 U.S. at 362.
6. Id. at 369.
7. Id. at 368-69 (citing Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 159
(1896)). See also Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Company, 200 U.S. 527 (1906)
(approving the condemnation of a right-of-way across the land of a private owner because
the public welfare required the use of rail lines to transport raw materials). The Court in
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Perhaps the most significant case that influenced the develop-
ment of the current interpretation of the public use clause was
Berman v. Parker,8 where Congress attempted to condemn a large
tract of blighted land in Washington, DC.9 The main issue in this
case was whether a state legislature with the requisite police
power had the power to condemn privately owned land under the
Fifth Amendment's takings clause for the purpose of relieving the
blight before redistributing the property to private owners.'"
Before addressing the Fifth Amendment issue, the Court made
the determination that, because Congress had the requisite police
power to determine what the valid public purpose was, public
purpose could be accomplished through the use of eminent do-
main." The appellants in this case owned an otherwise un-
blighted department store located in the area of the condemna-
tion. They argued that this was simply a transfer of property be-
tween private parties and, therefore, a private use. 2 Justice
Douglas rapidly dismissed that argument by explaining that the
public purpose in this case was the clearing of urban blight, and
the transfer of the property to another private businessman (for
the purposes of redevelopment) was merely a permissible method
of employing its police powers once the legislature determined a
valid public purpose. 3
The United States Supreme Court further expanded the defini-
tion of public use in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.4 Mid-
kiff involved a statute that authorized the taking of property from
a private owner, who happened to own a large proportion of the
this case upheld the notion that a strict and narrow interpretation of the public use clause
was the most appropriate. Strickley, 200 U.S. at 531.
8. 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (Douglas, J., delivered the majority opinion).
9. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28-30. In this case, note that because the condemnation oc-
curred in the District of Columbia, it was the United States Congress, and not a local
(state) legislature, that has the local police power to legislate within the bounds of the
District: Id. at 31-32 (citing District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100,
108 (1953)).
10. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28-32. The plan authorized the condemnation for purposes of
clearing substandard conditions to improve the "public health, safety, morals and welfare"
in the District of Columbia. Id.
11. Id. at 31-34.
12. Id. at 33.
13. Id. Also, the Court dismissed the landowner's charge that his land should not have
been condemned alongside the other property because his property, standing alone, was not
in any state of disrepair. Id. at 234. In dismissing this argument, the majority explained
that these plans often include a refurbishment of the entire area and it would not be feasi-
ble to complete the plan should every person in the development area be allowed to thwart
the condemnation of their individual property. Id. at 34-36.
14. 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court).
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land in the area, and the redistribution of the property to groups
of tenants occupying the land who had applied to have it con-
demned. 5 Justice O'Connor restated the law announced in Ber-
man and explained that the "public use requirement is cotermi-
nous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers."'" In doing so,
she reaffirmed the role of the courts as limited in their ability to
look at the legislature's determination of what a public use actu-
ally entails.17 Justice O'Connor then employed a similar analysis
to conclude that the use of the land was a proper use of the state's
police powers to regulate the health and welfare of the people liv-
ing within its boundaries. 8 Justice O'Connor further chastised
the old system of property ownership in Hawaii as an oligopoly
and classified the system as creating "social and economic evils" in
the form of a deficient land market, the elimination of which was a
proper public purpose."
Once it was determined that there was a proper public purpose,
the majority in Midkiff had little trouble concluding that the con-
demnation scheme set up by the Hawaii statute was a proper ex-
ercise of eminent domain.20 Justice O'Connor discussed the public
purpose test as more of a rational basis test."1 Justice O'Connor
further stated that as long as the lawmaking body executes a le-
gitimate plan (public use), and as long as its means-to-ends fit is
close enough (i.e., where it is not considered illogical), then the
Fifth Amendment taking will be deemed a proper public purpose.2 2
In other words, since the condemnation of the land owned by the
small faction of landowners was a rational means of carrying out a
legitimate public purpose, the use of eminent domain did not run
afoul of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.23
15. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233. The statute authorized taking of land when there was a
"concentration of land ownership ... in the hands of a few landowners who have refused to
sell the fee simple titles to their lands and have instead engaged in the practice of leasing
their lands under long-term leases." HAW. REV. STAT. § 516-83. The statute cites a short-
age of residential land creating a negative impact on the local residents who wished to
purchase the land on which they lived for a reasonable price. HAW. REV. STAT. § 516-83.
16. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
17. Id. at 240-41.
18. Id. at 241-42.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 242-43.
21. Mikiff, 467 U.S. at 242-43.
22. Id.
23. Id. Justice O'Connor further employed this reasoning to dismiss any notion that
the government should at some point possess the property during the taking in order to
qualify as a public use. Id. at 243-44.
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The interpretation of public use remained relatively consistent
in the federal sphere until June of 2005, when Kelo v. City of New
London opened the floodgates, potentially allowing any and all
uses to justify a taking under the Fifth Amendment.24 The situa-
tion in Kelo occurred in a city that was named as a "distressed
municipality" by the state of Connecticut because the local econ-
omy was considered extremely depressed due to the mass exodus
of industry.25 The situation called for an economic revitalization
plan, in which several tracts of land were to be condemned and
transferred to Pfizer, a pharmaceutical corporation.26 The purpose
of this taking was not a narrow cause and effect scheme, as in
Berman and Midkiff; rather, the plan was more speculative - the
land transfer to Pfizer would hopefully further the general eco-
nomic development of the city.27 Among those trapped in the con-
demnation was Susette Kelo, who owned unblighted property and
had made several improvements to her waterfront home in the
city.
28
The opinion began with the majority restating the prior relevant
case law with respect to the Public Use Clause, reaffirming the
notion that once a proper public purpose is determined, it does not
matter how that purpose is effectuated, even if it involves a trans-
fer to a private party.29 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens
further emphasized the notion of federalism in denoting the fact
that the prior decisions regarding the definition of public purpose
should be left alone since local legislatures are better equipped
with knowledge of problems within their own states, and they also
understand the best means to deal with those problems. ° Fur-
thermore, the majority rejected the Kelos' proposal that there
should have been a "bright-line" rule excluding private economic
development from the list of valid public purposes because Justice
Stevens believed there would have been no way to logically sepa-
rate economic development from other valid public purposes."
Justice Stevens and the rest of the majority rejected the idea
that approval of this taking would "blur the boundary between
24. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
25. Id. at 2658.
26. Id. at 2659.
27. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 9 and 15.
28. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
29. Id. at 2663-64 (Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, J.J.)
30. Id. at 2664.
31. Id. at 2665.
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public and private takings," explaining that private parties often
derive substantial benefits in takings cases, and this is permissi-
ble as long as the takings are performed under the pretext of a
valid public purpose. 2 Justice Stevens then promptly ignored a
hypothetical presented by the appellants." The hypothetical
asked what would happen if the Connecticut legislature made a
very small step further, allowing the taking of property from one
individual in favor of another individual simply because the sec-
ond individual would take greater economic advantage of the prop-
erty.
34
Justice Stevens then addressed the question of whether there
should be a "reasonable certainty" that the public would actually
benefit from the taking.35 The majority emphatically rejected that
argument presented by the appellants because it would create a
substantial division between this case and precedent. 6 As long as
the taking can be classified as a proper public purpose, the Court
will not inquire into the degree of certainty that the public benefit
will accrue.3 7
The majority opinion concluded by rejecting the appellants' ar-
gument that the taking of their lands in particular was unneces-
sary to properly effectuate the condemnation scheme.8 In so do-
ing, Justice Stevens reaffirmed Berman in saying that the state
legislature generally has full discretion to choose which lands it
should condemn in order to carry out its scheme once a legitimate
public purpose has been identified. 9
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion to discuss situa-
tions in which there should be a presumption of invalidity where
there is a question concerning whether the taking was for a valid
public purpose.4" Justice Kennedy disagreed with the proposition
that there should be a per se presumption of invalidity in all cases
because that could invalidate takings that would confer a consid-
erable benefit upon the public.4 Instead, Justice Kennedy sug-
gested that some room be left for a presumption of invalidity in
32. Id. at 2666 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)).
33. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666-67.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2667.
36. Id.
37. Id at 2667-68.
38. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
39. Id. See also supra note 13.
40. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 2670.
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cases where it appears there is favoritism toward a particular pri-
vate party, and only an ancillary or insubstantial benefit conferred
upon the public.4"
Justice O'Connor's seething dissent echoed the most immediate
concerns regarding the effect of this decision on the future of tak-
ings cases.43 First, Justice O'Connor noted that this was not a
case, such as in Berman or Midkiff, in which some social harm
was eliminated through the use of the condemnation scheme."
Justice O'Connor, therefore, queried how the property could be
taken without that justification.45
Justice O'Connor then discussed several propositions from the
majority opinion on how a state's power of eminent domain could
be limited.46 First, she points to the majority's suggestion that the
court will reserve itself a role in preventing takings that are made
solely (or at least substantially) for the purpose of private bene-
fit.47 In her response to that proposition, Justice O'Connor dis-
missed it because it would not be sensible to attempt to separate
out the government's considerations as to which party it intended
to benefit.48 The second issue that Justice O'Connor had with that
proposition is that even if there were an incidental public benefit
in cases in which the government favored a particular party, the
taking would still have an impermissible effect under the Takings
Clause. 9
The second suggestion that Justice O'Connor refutes is the im-
plicit proposition that eminent domain should only be used to im-
prove property as opposed to impairing property." Instead, Jus-
tice O'Connor dismissed this proposition as unrealistic because it
would involve mere speculation as to whether the property would
actually be improved by the new use.51
Third, Justice O'Connor rejected the proposition that takings
should only be allowed where they provide a myriad of other bene-
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Justice O'Connor was joined in her dissent by
Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia and Thomas, J.J.).
44. Id.
45. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also supra text accompany-
ing notes 10 and 19.




50. Id. at 2676.
51. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
715Summer 2006
Duquesne Law Review
fits in addition to tax or economic benefits." The problem that the
dissent saw in this proposal is that there would be no real way to
prevent takings under condemnation schemes that really provide
only tax benefits under the guise of providing other ancillary bene-
fits only as a subterfuge.53 Justice O'Connor further rejected Jus-
tice Kennedy's solution that the people look to the states for relief
in these situations, claiming that would be a mere relinquishment
of the Court's duty to uphold the Constitution.54 Most importantly,
Justice O'Connor concluded by noting that the burden of this deci-
sion would disproportionately fall on those who lack influence and
power in the legislative process, most notably the impoverished.55
Justice Thomas penned an additional dissent to argue that the
original cases interpreting the public use clause in the context of
transfers to private parties were improperly decided.56 Justice
Thomas discussed two particular lines of cases that led to the de-
cisions in Berman and Midkiff.57 First, Justice Thomas discussed
the deficiency of the public purpose test originally espoused in the
Fallbrook Irrigation case, explaining that first, it was unnecessary
to decide the case under such a test because that line of cases
could have simply been decided under a literal "use by the public"
test.58 Justice Thomas further chastised the "public purpose" test
as being "not susceptible of principled application."59
Justice Thomas then discussed a second group of cases that
primarily afforded the state legislatures almost total deference as
to the decision on what constitutes a proper public use or pur-
pose.6" Justice Thomas reasserted that the main idea of eminent
domain is to limit the power of the legislatures as opposed to
granting it power.6' Justice Thomas looked to other examples of
constitutional prohibitions in the Bill of Rights on the exercise of
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2676-77.
54. Id. at 2677.
55. Id.
56. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 2683-85.
58. Id. at 2683-84 (citing Fallbrook Irrigation v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896)).
59. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2683 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also noted that
the Supreme Court's adoption of the "public purpose" test was followed blindly in the later
cases, such as Clark, which included little or no analysis as to why that form of the test was
adopted. Id. (citing Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905)).
60. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2684 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Gettysburg
Electric R.R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896) (standing for the proposition that a legislature's
decision on what constitutes a public use will be given deference unless it is irrational)).
61. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2684 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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police powers, such as those afforded by Fourth Amendment in
search and seizure and due process cases.62 To Justice Thomas, it
is illogical for the Court to afford the legislature little deference in
those cases, while providing nearly unlimited deference to the leg-
islature to determine what, in fact, is or is not a public use or pur-
63pose.
Justice Thomas further explained that these two improper lines
of reasoning combined to elicit the reasoning espoused by the
writers of the majority opinion in the Kelo case.64 The dissenting
justice first noted that the Berman and Midkiff Courts errone-
ously equated eminent domain with the states' police powers be-
cause the Constitution has never required a state to provide com-
pensation in conjunction with the exercise of its police powers. 5
Justice Thomas argued that the rules from the Midkiff and Ber-
man cases are almost impossible to apply logically.66 For example,
a court could almost never decide that a taking was for a purely
private purpose unless it determined first that the taking did not
logically "advance the public interest."67 Justice Thomas also ex-
pressed his confoundedness with the majority's belief that a literal
public use interpretation would be more difficult to apply than the
broader public purpose interpretation, and he nearly accused the
majority of destroying a part of the Constitution.6 Justice Thomas
then concluded his dissent with a proposal that the Court return
to a more literal public use interpretation and only allow takings
in the cases where the governmental unit actually uses the prop-
erty or where it allows the public some right to use it.69
III. PENNSYLVANIA'S INCONSISTENT FORMULATION
OF THE DEFINITION OF "PUBLIC USE"
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania also
contains a Public Use Clause that has been subject to varying in-
62. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) and Deck v. Missouri, 125 S. Ct.
2007 (2005)).
63. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2684-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 2685.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2686.
67. Id.




terpretations.70  However, the interpretations of the Public Use
Clause in Pennsylvania have resulted in a somewhat convoluted
definition of what constitutes public use or public purpose.
Among the first cases to interpret Pennsylvania's Public Use
Clause was Lance's Appeal.7 1 This case involved the condemnation
of a tract of land to make way for a new railroad.72 The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court upheld the statute which provided for the
taking, and in doing so explained that the Commonwealth can
never exercise its power of eminent domain unless it is for a valid
public purpose." The court in Lance's Appeal defined public pur-
pose as one that is "supposed and intended to benefit the public,
ether mediately or immediately" and is one that "arises out of that
natural principle which teaches that private convenience must
yield to the public wants."74 It appeared from the onset that Penn-
sylvania's interpretation of the Public Use Clause would corre-
spond to the broad definition employed by United States Supreme
Court throughout the twentieth century.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of the Public
Use Clause would then begin to contradict itself beginning with
the case of Philadelphia Clay Co. v. York Clay Co. 75 Philadelphia
Clay Co. involved the condemnation of a tract of land in order to
construct a tramway to facilitate the transportation of raw mate-
rials for a private corporation.7 '6 The condemnation scheme was
invalidated because the property was not used by the public in any
fashion.7 Furthermore, the court pointed out that the company
that wished to force the transfer was not chartered to transport
raw materials as a service for the public.78 Here, the court began a
rapid shift towards a more literal interpretation of the public use
clause, but maintained a very subtle suggestion that the public
use test could be satisfied if the public somehow benefited from
the taking.79 Most notably absent from this analysis was any ref-
70. See PA. CONST. art I, § 10. The takings clause in Pennsylvania reads in full: "[Nior
shall private property be taken or applied to public use, without authority of law and with-
out just compensation being first made or secured." Id.
71. 55 Pa. 16 (1866).
72. Lance's Appeal, 55 Pa. at 17.
73. Id. at 25.
74. Id.
75. 88 A. 487 (Pa. 1913).
76. Philadelphia Clay Co., 88 A. at 487.
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erence to the original broad public purpose test adopted by the
court in Lance's Appeal.8 °
Less than one month after the decision in the Philadelphia Clay
Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court further contradicted itself
by abandoning the broad interpretation of the Public Use Clause
in favor of a narrow, literal interpretation in the case of Pennsyl-
vania Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. City of Philadelphia."1 This
case involved the condemnation of property belonging to one busi-
ness merely to transfer it to another business after placing build-
ing restrictions on the parcel of land.82 The reasons provided in
the statute that would authorize the condemnation were specifi-
cally "to protect such ... parkways ... their environs, the preser-
vation of the view, appearance, light, air, health or usefulness
thereof."83 In other words, the condemnation was for the mere
purpose of improving aesthetics of the land near the highway.'
In adopting a new test in the Commonwealth for determining if
property was taken under the pretext of a valid public use, the
court completely abandoned the public purpose test, and elected to
take a strict literal interpretation to the clause. 5  Justice
Mestrezat demonstrated his suspicion of legislative and judicial
abuse by saying:
If, however, public benefit, utility or advantage is to be
the test of a public use, then, as suggested by the authori-
ties, the right to condemn the property will not depend on
a fixed standard by which the legislative and judicial de-
partments of the government are to be guided, but upon
the views of those who at the time are to determine the
question. There will be no limit to the power of either the
Legislature or the courts to appropriate private property
to public use, except their individual opinions as to what
is and what is not for the public advantage and utility.86
80. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 69.
81. 88 A. 904 (Pa. 1913).
82. Pa. Mut. Lif. Ins., 88 A. at 905.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 907. The literal "use by the public" test was favored over one that interpreted
the public use clause as meaning "public utility or advantage." Id. (citing Arnsperger v.
Crawford, 61 A. 413, 415 (Md. 1905)).
86. Id. at 907. Curiously enough, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the literal
interpretation, whereas the United States Supreme Court firmly rejected that test as insuf-
ficient. See supra note 7.
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With this ruling, the original broad public purpose analysis per-
formed by the court in the mid nineteenth century appeared all
but forgotten. Since the condemnation scheme would have been
carried out in the form of a transfer to another private individual,
the fact that it was performed merely to aesthetically improve the
area resulted in the scheme being struck down.87
In Pioneer Coal Co. v. Cherrytree & Dixonville R.R. Co.,"5 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would once again ignore precedent
and expand the definition of public use that it set when it dealt
with a governmental taking of land to benefit a private coal com-
pany.89 The court held this taking to be a public use, even though
the vast majority of the public would not use the property. 90 The
court justified this holding by stating that "the life, happiness, and
prosperity of the people of Pennsylvania depend to a very large
degree upon getting the coal supply of the state out of the
mines . *. .." This essentially broadened the strict definition of
public use the court had adopted in Pennsylvania Mutual Insur-
ance Co v. City of Philadelphia."
In Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority,93 the city of
Philadelphia enacted a condemnation scheme to reconstruct areas
that were deemed slums in order to "[provide] sanitary dwelling
accommodations for persons of low income."  Since the plan pro-
vided for the immediate transfer of property to a private party, it
was naturally argued that the land was not taken for a public use
within the meaning of the public use clause as it appears in both
the Pennsylvania and the United States Constitutions.95 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court responded to that complaint by ex-
plaining that "what constitutes a public use necessarily var[ies]
with changing conceptions of the scope and functions of govern-
ment, so that to-day [sic] there are familiar examples of such use
which formerly would not have been so considered."9" The court
further explained the argument that the circumstance in which
87. Pa. Mut. Life Ins., 88 A. at 908.
88. 116 A. 45 (Pa. 1922).
89. Pioneer Coal Co., 116 A. at 45.
90. Id. at 48.
91. Id.
92. See supra note 81. The court in Pioneer Coal also overlooked the notion that the
product of the transported natural resources would eventually be used by the public to
satisfy energy needs.
93. 200A. 834 (Pa. 1938).
94. Dornan, 200 A. at 837.
95. Id. at 838.
96. Id. at 840.
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the new houses would not be used by the entire public was "lack-
ing legal significance" because there are many occasions in which
buildings are constructed and for use only by a portion of the pub-
lic, yet should nevertheless be considered a public use.97
The fact that the court began to expand the definition from the
hard and fast rule set forth in 1913 reflects an ignorance of the
rationale set forth in Pennsylvania Mutual Insurance Co. In a
reminder of the court's decision in Pennsylvania Mutual, the spe-
cific concerns articulated by the court were to limit the power of
other courts and the legislature in defiming what exactly consti-
tuted a public use.98 The courts in Pioneer Coal Co. and Dornan
cited rationale that conflicted with Pennsylvania Mutual.99 The
courts allowed the rule to be adjusted by the courts to reflect the
changing needs of society as time progresses, without directly
overruling the original strict interpretation. 1°°
IV. THE FLUCTUATING ROLE OF THE COURTS
IN REVIEWING LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS
Since the turn of the twentieth century, the role of the courts in
reviewing legislative decisions throughout has been subject to
great fluctuation. The courts started by taking an almost over-
bearing role while giving no deference to the legislatures. Subse-
quently, that role has eroded to the point that the courts have sur-
rendered their power to the legislatures, whom they believe to be
better equipped to handle the problems. However, in certain
situations, the courts have re-asserted their constitutional author-
ity to review legislative determinations in order to prevent legisla-
tures from overstepping their constitutional limitations. The
cases dealing with the public use clause have, to this point, fol-
lowed the same format, but curiously the courts have yet to re-
97. Id. The court specifically produced jails and poorhouses as examples of buildings
which the entire public does not use. Id. Also, the court in this case cited several United
States Supreme Court decisions, including those that were ignored in the Philadelphia
Mutual case, namely Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896). Dornan,
200 A. at 840. See also supra note 7.
98. See supra text accompanying note 81.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86 and 90. The rule generated in the Pioneer
Coal and Dornan cases would later be restated as a "public purpose" test. See Belovsky v.
Redevelopment Authority of City of Philadelphia, 54 A.2d 277 (Pa. 1947) (holding the tak-
ing of private property to cure urban blight is a valid public purpose, despite the transfer of
property to a private corporation to undertake the development).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86 and 90.
Summer 2006
Duquesne Law Review
assert a role in preventing legislatures from having unfettered
discretion in determining what constitutes a public use.
The judiciary's wavering between asserting a passive role and
an active role in defining "public use" is best illustrated by the
handling of the commerce clause cases in the United States Su-
preme Court. Beginning in the early twentieth century, the Court
began with a literal interpretation of the Commerce Clause in
cases such as Hammer v. Dagenhart.°' In that case, the Court
struck down a federal law prohibiting the interstate commerce of
products that were created through child labor."2 In striking
down the legislation, Justice Day opined that the law was regulat-
ing the manufacture of goods rather than the interstate commerce
of goods. °3 Since the manufacture of goods did not fit the defini-
tion of interstate commerce (in other words, dealing with "traffic
and intercourse"), the law was an impermissible exercise of legis-
lative power under Article I of the United States Constitution. °4
This literal approach to the law taken in Hammer v. Dagenhart,
comports with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's handling of
Pennsylvania Mutual. There, the court employed the more literal
interpretation, creating a test that effectively would have struck
down any taking that did not amount to a literal public use.''
There was a deficiency of United States Supreme Court cases
dealing with takings prior to Clark v. Nash in 1905 due to a lack
of federal regulation with regards to eminent domain.0 '
The second step of the evolution of the United States Supreme
Court's role in reviewing legislative schemes can be found in
United States v. Darby.10 7 In that case, the Court began to relin-
quish its power in reviewing legislative determinations in the con-
text of labor law, more specifically a statute that prohibited the
interstate shipment of lumber if workers who earned below the
minimum wage requirements had manufactured it.' The Court
101. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
102. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 268.
103. Id. at 271-72.
104. Id. at 273-74. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
105. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
106. The lack of United States Supreme Court cases dealing with state-run condemna-
tion schemes stems from the fact that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states
until it was selectively incorporated to apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in 1897. See supra note 1. It remains to be seen whether the United States Supreme
Court would have adopted a more literal interpretation of the Public Use Clause had it
been able to review state imposed condemnation schemes prior to that date.
107. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
108. Darby, 312 U.S. at 105.
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decided to uphold the statute despite the fact that the employees
in this case were involved in the manufacture of the product.09
The majority concluded that the manufacture of goods impacted
interstate commerce.1 ' In other words, the Supreme Court elimi-
nated a literal distinction between manufacturing and the trans-
portation of goods, directly overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, and
read a more liberal rule that extended it beyond the literal mean-
ing of the word commerce. With the broader, more encompassing
meaning of the word commerce, the power of the legislature would
grow exponentially, resulting in an almost unchecked ability to
legislate on nearly any matter they desired."'
The contracting role of the courts in reviewing legislation under
the Commerce Clause is very similar to the contracting role
adopted by the courts in takings cases in Pennsylvania via Pioneer
Coal Co. and Dornan and also in the federal sphere in light of
Clark v. Nash."2 The effect of the High Court's refusal to reassert
a role in reviewing legislative determinations would naturally
have the same effect in eminent domain cases as it did in Com-
merce Clause cases: it allows nearly unfettered discretion to name
anything a public use. The Kelo case has seen the farthest exten-
sion of the public use clause to date by the legislature."3
The final step in Commerce Clause cases involved a situation in
which the United States Supreme Court stepped in and reasserted
a role in reviewing legislation which took the farthest and remote
extension of the Commerce Clause. In United States v. Lopez,"'
the Supreme Court reviewed a statute that, under the guise of the
Commerce Clause, made it unlawful to possess a firearm in a
school zone."5 The Supreme Court found the relationship between
109. Id. at 29-43.
110. Id.
111. See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding under the Com-
merce Clause a statutory limitation on how much wheat a farmer was allowed to farm and
harvest).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7, 86, and 90.
113. See supra text accompanying note 26.
114. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
115. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549. The rationale extended by Congress in this situation was
that violent crime substantially impacts interstate commerce. Id. at 560. For example,
people are less likely to travel to areas that are perceived to be riddled with violent crime.
Id. Furthermore, the negative impact on education would likely result in an 'adverse im-
pact on the Nation's economic well-being." Id.
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the Commerce Clause and gun control too tenuous and struck
down the regulation."6
The United States Supreme Court's stance in Lopez represented
a power shift back to the courts in order to prevent the legislature
from moving beyond its constitutional authority. The Court in
Kelo, on the other hand, had an opportunity to limit the most
speculative and remote interpretations of the Public Use Clause to
date. The condemnation scheme in Kelo only provided for a poten-
tial economic benefit to the city, compared to what was needed
before.' While it is certainly within the purview of the states leg-
islatures to determine what constitutes a proper public use, the
power to do so is not absolute. The United States Supreme Court
had little trouble in reasserting its constitutional role with respect
to the Commerce Clause cases, but failed to do so with respect to
the Public Use Clause. It remains to be seen how the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court would rule a case similar to Kelo, as the is-
sue has yet to arise in the Commonwealth."'
V. OUTLINE AND EVALUATION OF INDIVIDUAL
STATES' RESPONSES TO KELO
Since it the United States Supreme Court has failed to assert a
stern role when enforcing the Takings Clause with respect to the
Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the onus is upon the
states to formulate rules designed to prevent remote and far-
reaching legislative definitions of public use."9 While Pennsyl-
116. Id. at 559-60. The Court reasoned that first of all, the activity regulated in this
case was not economic, and furthermore there was no showing as to how possession of a
gun in a school zone would impact other states, and therefore interstate commerce. Id.
117. See supra text accompanying note 26. Contrast this with situations in which the
public received an immediate benefit, such as natural resources, the repair of a defective
real estate market or the immediate elimination of unsanitary living conditions. See supra
note 15. See also supra text accompanying notes 9, 83-84.
118. There is currently a case in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, Down
Under GFB Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, in which the City of Philadelphia condemned pri-
vately-owned land to create an extended driveway for the FedEx corporation. Shannon P.
Smith, Suit against Philadelphia to Test 'Kelo' Decision, Legal Intelligencer (Oct. 6, 2005),
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/newswire-article.jsp?id=1128503111087.
119. The states are permitted to provide greater, but not lesser, protection than that
afforded by the federal government with respect to the Bill of Rights. See Commonwealth
v. Edmonds, 586 A.2d 887, 894 (Pa. 1991) (citing Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 467 (Pa.
1983)) (stating the proposition the state may afford more protection than the minimum
amount given by the federal Constitution in the context of a Fourth Amendment search and
seizure case). See also Commonwealth v. Yastrop, 768 A.2d 318 (Pa. 2001) (citing examples
of various jurisdictions that afforded more protection than the minimum federal Constitu-
tional standards in the context of search and seizure cases). While the United States Su-
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vania has not introduced any legislation to date which would limit
the scope of the Public Use Clause, the Kelo case has sparked
enough outrage to result in legislation being introduced in several
states. The approaches range from state constitutional amend-
ments calling for outright bans on takings for economic activities
to increased compensation for takings that cite economic develop-
ment as the reason for the taking. This section evaluates several
proposed solutions from various jurisdictions.
The first and most restrictive approach includes an outright ban
on takings where the cited public use is economic development.
Several states have proposed constitutional amendments to this
effect. For example, Alabama has proposed a constitutional
amendment prohibiting takings for purposes of economic devel-
opment."' Florida has proposed to eliminate economic develop-
ment as a justification for public use."' Likewise, Georgia is pro-
posing a constitutional amendment making it unlawful to use
eminent domain to transfer property to a private party in order to
increase tax revenue, and prohibits economic development as a
justification.'22
Some states are also proposing simple legislation that would
have the same effect. Two examples of simple legislation to this
effect are competing bills from California. An assembly bill ex-
cludes from the definition of "public use" any "taking or damaging"
of private property for private use, including, but not limited to,
situations in which the property would be used for economic de-
velopment.2 ' Alternatively, a senate bill prohibits the use of emi-
nent domain to "acquire owner-occupied residential real property"
if it is to be transferred to another private party. 1
24
These statutory schemes would obviously have the effect of
eliminating situations similar to Kelo; however, some of them are
likely drafted too broadly. For example, in Alabama and Georgia,
the proposed amendments banning all economically-motivated
takings, will likely have the effect of eliminating some takings
preme Court chose not to give more protection in takings cases dealing with the Public Use
Clause, any jurisdiction is permitted to give an increased amount of protection to individu-
als.
120. H. B. 117, 2005 1st. Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005). Specifically enumerated in this bill are
economic development to increase tax revenue and the creation of jobs. Id. However, those
two activities are not exhaustive. Id.
121. H.R. J. Res. 31, 108th Sess. (Fla. 2005).
122. H.R. Res. 87, 148th Assemb. (Ga. 2005).
123. Assemb. B. 590, 2005 Leg. (Cal. 2005).
124. S. B. 1026, 2005 Leg. (Cal. 2005).
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that would otherwise be permissible, such as cases that produce
multiple outcomes like economic development as an ancillary ef-
fect. The most carelessly drafted is the California Senate Bill, as
it would effectively prevent states from taking in any situations,
especially in urban renewal projects, which always result in a
transfer to a private party. The better approaches are more care-
fully worded. For instance, the proposed bill in Georgia forbids
property from being transferred to private parties only when the
main purpose of the condemnation is the increase of tax revenue
or economic development.
Some states have taken a different, more limited approach, al-
lowing for some economically-motivated takings. For example,
Massachusetts has proposed a law that prohibits the taking of
property if the reason behind the taking is related to economic
development."' The bill, however, still provides for situations in
which the purpose of the taking is to repair urban blight.26 Like-
wise, Texas has proposed somewhat more complex legislation pro-
hibiting the taking of private property for economic development,
yet still allowing for eminent domain takings for purposes of
"community development" and also situations in which blighted
land is to be remedied.' Notably, however, the proposed legisla-
tion specifically spells out that traditional eminent domain cases,
such as utilities and transportation-related projects are still per-
missible.128 Michigan, meanwhile, is proposing a ban on any eco-
nomically-motivated takings where the primary beneficiary of the
taking is a private party.'29
These approaches are likely to prove to have the most desired
effects with respect to opponents of the Kelo decision. The limited
approaches also appear to be more of a middle ground with respect
to private parties and governments wishing to complete urban
renewal projects. It is evident that the Michigan approach would
work in most cases, but in cases such as Kelo, it may be difficult to
ascertain who the primary beneficiary of a taking would be. On
the other hand, while Texas's approach is carefully worded, it is
unnecessary to specifically enumerate public utilities and high-
125. H.D. R. 4662 184th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2005).
126. Id.
127. S. B. 62, 79th Legis. (Tex. 2005). The bill also excludes any type of eminent domain
that is intended to be carried out as a subterfuge in actually benefiting a private party. Id.
128. Id.
129. H.R. J. Res. N, 93d Legis. (Mich. 2005).
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ways as permissible uses, as they have always been recognized as
legitimate justifications for the takings
The third and least restrictive approach has been attempted in
New York. Essentially, it provides no prohibition on takings for
private economic development and instead focuses on the compen-
sation element of the takings clause. 3 ' Rather than implementing
an outright ban on economically-motivated takings or takings
which primarily benefit private parties, the New York Senate pro-
poses an increase on the required compensation given for such
takings.' Specifically, the statute requires the owner of a home
to be compensated with 150% of the fair market value of the prop-
erty, and in the cases where the owner is temporarily displaced,
he would get 150% of the rental value of the property."2
While this novel concept could have the effect of discouraging
economically motivated takings, in most economic development
cases, the private party that benefits is generally one that is in a
superior economic position. If it is more expensive to take a piece
of land for economic development purposes, it may discourage
some private parties from initiating condemnation proceedings,
but it overall will not have a drastic impact on the takings cases it
was designed to impact. The only real benefit of this statutory
scheme appears to be that the displaced condemnees will derive a
much greater profit than they would if they were to sell their land
on the open market.
While the United States Supreme Court's role in preventing
takings that are remotely related to public uses has been signifi-
cantly limited, it remains to be seen whether many of the states,
particularly Pennsylvania, will follow suit. Currently, Pennsyl-
vania once again has two opportunities to assert a role in prevent-
ing such takings: one is in the pending case in Philadelphia, and
the other would be an opportunity to introduce legislation aimed
at preventing such takings.' It is unlikely that a court would up-
hold a taking where the public use is so remote (even more re-
motely related to public uses than the situation in Kelo), such as
the case in Philadelphia where the condemnation is focused on
transferring private property to create an extended driveway to
benefit a private corporation. The best approach to prevent any
130. S.B. 5946, 228th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See supra note 115.
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ambiguity in the Commonwealth would be to adopt a precisely-
worded prohibition on economically motivated takings, but leaving
several options to allow for necessary takings that would be pro-
hibited by an outright ban.'34
Mark S. Kubiak
134. At the time the final edits were completed to this comment, legislation was formally
signed into effect by Governor Rendell on May 4, 2006 that allows taking of private prop-
erty for private development only if the land was found to be blighted. See e.g. S.B. 881,
189th Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005); 26 PA. CONS. STAT. §204 (this section, titled "emi-
nent domain for private businesses prohibited," greatly limits the exercise of the eminent
domain to take private property in order to use it for a private enterprise). See also Rendell
Signs Bills Limiting Use of Eminent Domain, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 5, 2006, available at
2006 WLNR 7691570. Apparently, the solution recently signed into law would take care of
most of the concerns generated by Kelo; however, it remains to be seen if this solution is too
restrictive.
728 Vol. 44
